Introduction
The paper focuses on the effectiveness of the Fed and ECB monetary policies over the period 1999 . As Fontana (2006 put forward, the Fed's 'dual mandate' allows for more flexible monetary policy than the single mandate of the ECB. That is an important topic of the characterization of both monetary policies over the short run. But the 'dual mandate' vanishes when the long run monetary policy objectives are considered, at least in the official discourse.
In the long run, the official primary objective of both central banks merely amounts to ensure price stability, as recommended by the 'New Consensus' principles of governance (see Rochon, 2006) . In practice, however, the policies show some distance from the theory, especially in the case of the Fed (Galbraith, 2006 ).
Yet, while the European Union follows more accurately the new-economics recommendations on prices and public deficits control, the Fed's policy seems to be more effective. Various authors have put forward the Greenspan's pragmatism or the ECB's dogmatism as the main cause of the Fed's relative success 1 , but the reasons why pragmatism ought to do better than a thorough application of the mainstream theoretical recommendations remain unexplored. The paper explores those reasons by considering the advantage of pragmatism in the face of Keynesian uncertainty. The argument is basically that the 'New Consensus' macroeconomic policies entail pernicious effects when they are implemented in a system which doesn't tend spontaneously toward any 'natural' position.
We put forward three arguments. a) According to the 'New Consensus', monetary policy may be helpful in stabilizing the economy around the assumed 'natural' trajectory in case of nominal rigidities. But in a system without natural anchoring, as the one Keynes considered in his General Theory, if the central bank takes the current rate of unemployment as a 'natural' one, it tends to anchor the economy away from full employment. b) Distributive tensions (like wages, mark-up or fiscal pressures) feed the demand for money and push monetary authorities to arbitrate between providing more money so as to preserve the economic activity (which feeds the cost push spiral) or raising the rate of interest so as to repress inflationary pressures.
While reducing monetary inflation has no permanent cost in terms of unemployment in the mainstream theory for the supply side is the driving force in the long run, it does in a Keynesian world where the effective demand is the driving force the short and in the long run. c) As macroeconomic policy involves both monetary and fiscal authorities, independent decisions may produce coordination failures. It happens that unconditional low inflation targeting is likely to produce adverse policy interactions in the Eurozone. For example, a rise in the rate of interest aiming at countering the average inflationary effects of the fiscal impulse implemented in any country weakens the effective demand for all the member countries.
The paper contains two sections. The first one starts by comparing the 'official' monetary policies of both regions. Then, the 'New Consensus' precepts are emphasized and compared with the implemented policies. Section 2 discusses the advantage of pragmatism in the face of Keynesian uncertainty.
Similar discourses, different practices
This section shows that, in accordance with the 'New Consensus' macroeconomics which clearly inspires the official discourses, the Fed and ECB mission in the long run amounts to stabilize the price index (1.1). But in practice, the ECB applies the low inflation targeting policy more thoroughly (1.2).
Similar discourses
The official documentation of the ECB refers quite transparently to the essential features of the 'New Consensus' (namely, money neutrality and supply side leading role 2 ), and therefore denies any influence of the monetary policy on output and employment in the long run:
"(…) in the long run, real income is essentially determined by supply-side factors (e.g.
technology, population growth, the flexibility of markets and the efficiency of the institutional framework of the economy). It is therefore the task of fiscal and structural policies -but also of those involved in the wage-bargaining process -to enhance the Clearly, both central banks aim at counter short run price deviation related to temporary demand shocks (which supposes active support to activity), but in case of supply shocks, they will arbitrate between reducing inflationary pressures and smoothing their impact on employment and activity. Hence, according to the official discourses, the Fed and ECB monetary policies could only differ in the way they manage supply shocks in the short run.
Over the long run, they should not differ or have real effects. The experience of the ECB maybe is too short to allow drawing robust conclusions, but empirical comparison with the Fed's policy nevertheless provide interesting information on the subject.
Monetary policies in practice
The period considered starts with a sharp increase in oil prices and a tightening of monetary policies that will be ephemeral in both regions because of the change of the international macroeconomic context. In the United States, the burst of the speculative bubble at the end of basis points by month) before the slowdown of the summer when they reach 3,5%. The terrorist attacks trigger a second wave of decreases: from 3,5% in the early September, the federal funds rate pass to 3% on September 17, 2,5 in October, 2 in November, and 1,75% in December, staying at this level about one year). Clearly, the oil prices inflationary pressures are relegated in the background because of the deflation threat, with the result that the monetary policy supports aggregate demand strongly.
In the same time, the recession in Europe prompts the ECB to relax its policy, but the response is much weaker. Considering that monetary policy does not influence real magnitudes over the long run, the ECB gives priority to the stabilization of inflation Here can be seen the consequences of declaring an inflation target: by committing to maintain the inflation rate near to 2% over the medium term, the ECB indeed leaves itself some room for manoeuvre in the short run 7 , some discretionary power, all the more as the 'short' and 'medium run' notions are not precisely defined. But, on the one hand, that power is more limited than the Fed's one, for the Fed does not specify any quantitative target 8 , and on the other hand, it makes it dangerous to support frankly the economic activity in the face of important shocks, since the inflation gap which would result could be considered an infringement of the declared target, and therefore could harm the ECB's credibility and feed inflation expectations 9 .
Finally, the sort of 'constrained discretion' implemented by the ECB seems to be more effective to stabilize prices (see figure 2 ), but the data suggest that there is a substantial cost in terms of economic activity (see figure 3 ). It is paradoxical to believe in money neutrality and to be so anxious about inflation. To believe in money neutrality and to affirm at the same time, as both central banks do, that inflation is prejudicial to resources allocation. The central banks purpose is actually that money is neutral provided there is no inflation, because inflation does interfere with the real prices adjustment and resources allocation, which amounts to say, tautologically, that money is neutral provided money is neutral. Either money is neutral and inflation does not really matter, or it is not, and then inflation and monetary policy must be investigated within an appropriate theoretical framework.
The Walrasian approach to general equilibrium, in the form proposed by Arrow and Debreu in 1954, rests upon a theoretical market system which allows for spot and future contracts. The hypothesis of a complete set of markets ensures that spot and all futures prices are initially determined by the supply-demand matching conditions. Therefore, the system is not really dynamic, since the future is reduced to the accomplishment of the transactions initially decided.
In this framework, where any competitive equilibrium is shown to be Pareto optimal as concerns resources allocation, integrating money and inflation raises important difficulties, for it would require that spot markets will open in the future so as to take account of possible changes in prices, and that would contradict the view that transactions are predetermined for all dates in the future (which is required for the intertemporal Pareto optimal equilibrium being determined). Hence, in this conceptual intertemporal framework, inflation and monetary policy can not be integrated but in the neutral way. That supposes to reduce uncertainty to risk, in order for the future prices to be initially foreseeable within a stochastic 'white noise' around the assumed 'natural' trajectory. Actually, from the theoretical point of view, it is well known that optimality is not a general property of competitive markets since the stability of the walrasian competitive equilibrium is questionable, even in the absence of uncertainty; stability requires specific conditions (namely gross substitution of aggregate demand functions). But the 'Sonnenshein-Mantel-Debreu' theorem stated that nothing ensures such conditions within the Walras-Arrow-Debreu framework. Thus, efficiency of competitive markets unfortunately simply is a postulate that reflects the beliefs of those who refer to it, it is not a scientifically established result. Finally, it is because they deny uncertainty and believe to competitive market optimality that central banks claim that prices stability is a precondition of efficiency.
The view on the effectiveness of uncertainty and on the efficiency of markets is crucial in monetary policy theory, for the adequate policy closely depends on the long run properties of the economic system. For example, in the mainstream's ergodic representation of the world, the economic system is assumed to possess strong regulatory forces which, in the long run, anchor the economy on a predetermined trajectory and make rational expectations reliable.
Within such a representation, the best monetary policy can do is to stabilize the economy around the predetermined or 'natural' trajectory 10 . On the other hand, there is no predetermined trajectory in non-ergodic regimes, with the result that people can not reasonably have full confidence in their expectations, even rationally conceived. That is the starting point of Keynes's liquidity preference theory, and of The General Theory. In these regimes, monetary policy takes part in the trajectory of the economic system both in the short and in the long run. It is not neutral.
This section discusses the effects of uncertainty on the macroeconomic adjustment mechanisms and then considers the drawbacks that may result from implementing the monetary policy of the 'New Consensus' in a Keynesian system which does not have any 'natural' anchor or trajectory.
Uncertainty and macroeconomic adjustment
Keynes, in relation with the widest apprehension of uncertainty, conceived his general theory without postulating any 'natural' position or trajectory. That does not mean that people can not make rational expectations, but the meaning and usefulness of such forward looking information is far weaker than the one usually given to it in mainstream's economics.
Keynesian rational expectations admit that people make use of all the available information, of course, but whatever the kind of probabilistic tools they might make use of, true uncertainty makes it not so rational to consider expectations a satisfactory basis for decision making. That is the reason why Keynes thought that decisions actually "also depend on the confidence with which we make this forecast--on how highly we rate the likelihood of our best forecast turning out quite wrong" (Keynes, 1936, ch. 12, s. 2).
The liquidity preference concept, which results from that kind of uncertainty, has heavy consequences as concerns the macroeconomic adjustment process. If aggregate demand and prices decrease, the misleadingly called 'Keynes effect' and the real balance effect do not work as an anchor to the full employment, for speculative and precautionary decisions may increase the demand for money, thereby inhibiting the interest rate and the real balance effects. Furthermore, the money supply may endogenously decrease along with the demand for money. As a matter of consequences, the output and employment equilibrium levels depend on the level at which the monetary policy and the demand for money will eventually put the rate of interest. This is the reason why Keynes thought about his general theory as a theory of shifting equilibrium 11 . 
Implicit
Aggregate budget constraint (a) As stated by Davidson (1983) , the marginal product equalization to the real labour cost does not provide the labour demand function, but the 'real wage -effective demand' relationship n is the relative variation in employment n f is the total labour force w is the nominal wage relative variation y is the relative variation in volume of output c represents exogenous technological factors g is the relative variation in the government demand for goods t is the tax rate variation (which has both a supply and a demand effect: see appendix n°1) a is the relative variation in the exogenous part of aggregate private demand iˆ is the variation in the rate of interest m is the relative variation in the quantity of money
Within the usual four macro-markets framework, a general equilibrium supposes a set of conditions which expresses compatible aggregate supply and demand plans. Because of the generalized budget constraint 13 , three markets only have to be explicit (the bonds market will remain implicit), which supposes two relative prices (the real wage in terms of goods, the rate of interest and the real price of money in terms of goods, which inverse is the nominal price of goods). Moreover, since the interest rate is assumed to be exogenous for the moment, the general equilibrium conditions reduce to five: the goods market supply and demand conditions (which compatibility requires the equilibrium values y* and p*), the labour market supply and demand conditions (which compatibility requires n* and w*), and the money market clearing condition, given the exogenous interest rate (which requires m*). We focus on the short run motion of the system, in the sense that the productive physical stock of capital is assumed to be constant during the period considered. Hence, variables are expressed in terms of relative variations from their initial value, except the rate of interest and the tax rate, which are expressed as variations. All parameters are positive.
Because of the effects of uncertainty on the 'state of confidence', the liquidity preference theory can explain unforeseeable shifts in the demand for money (The General Theory, Ch. 12) . This specificity of Keynes's approach will be formally underlined through considering η an exogenous variable subject to the volatility of expectations (equation 5) 14 . It has heavy implications on monetary policy because it makes the central bank control of the long term interest rate questionable. When the monetary base is increased through lowering the short term rate, lower long term bank rates in principle boost the demand for credit, provided the liquidity preference does not shift too much. But an increasing liquidity preference may conversely make banks able to sell more credit without having to reduce their interest rates, for non-bank loans (bonds) rates in this case tend to rise in order to compensate the increasing liquidity preference. Therefore, the 'New Consensus' optimal monetary rule, which assumes that authorities always can adjust the rate of interest to the assumed 'natural' level, is irrelevant in a Keynesian context 15 .
Inflation targeting drawbacks in the absence of a 'natural' anchor
According to the 'New Consensus' macroeconomics, monetary and fiscal instruments can be activated usefully, in the presence of nominal rigidities, so as to reduce the volatility of aggregate demand, output and prices around the assumed 'natural' trajectory, as indicated in Table 2 . According to these formal policy rules, the central bank implements disinflation measures when the level of unemployment decreases, while the government set taxes and/or expenditures so as to adjust the budget balance (b, see appendix n°4) in a counter-cyclical way. Such governance principles work symbiotically within the ergodic 'New Consensus' approach 17 . They stabilize perfectly the system, without budget balance deviations since the governments have two instruments and may therefore stabilize both, the output level and the budget balance, while the central bank stabilizes the price index. But the same principles may produce severe drawbacks if they are implemented in the non-ergodic system of Table 1 .
Indeed, in the presence of Keynesian unemployment, that is to say, without spontaneous return towards the full employment, as long as the actual unemployment and interest rates are interpreted as 'natural' rates, they serve as macroeconomic policy targets, with the result that the policy mix 'symbiotically' anchors the system away from the full employment (provided the central bank has enough influence on the long term interest rate). The situation then may persist for it seems to be the consequence of real wages rigidity (p=0, and w= w provided n f =0), which is one of the main causes of natural unemployment in the 'New Consensus'
Macroeconomics.
This line of argument suggests a kind of unemployment trap, to which the mainstream economics uses to refer as hysteresis 18 : when authorities lack for room for manoeuvre in the face of a negative shock, for example because of budget balance considerations, the output stabilization only works partially, and unemployment increases. Since nothing tends to reduce it then, authorities take the actual unemployment rate as the new 'natural' one. This gives a rationale to the idea that the dogmatism of the ECB, along with the Stability and Growth Pact, could have weighed on the employment situation of the Eurozone after the economic reversal of the early 2000s, therefore explaining the stagnation that followed.
Similar drawbacks may arise in case of distributive tensions. According to Table 1 , the mark-up price equation (2) shows inflation factors that depend on income distribution concerns (mark-up, fiscal tax rate, wages pressure relative to productivity gains 19 ). These As concerns income distribution, beyond the pragmatism of the Fed, the USA has had the advantage of knowing more favourable economic conditions than he ECB. Although the globalization has not been propitious for wage claims (in both regions), there has been nevertheless a noticeable increase of the profit share (and therefore of the mark-up) in Europe, whereas that share revealed more stable in Anglo-Saxon countries 21 . Furthermore, the appreciable acceleration of the United States productivity gains in the second half of the nineties resulted in a persistent difference between the annual rates of change (see figure 4) . Table 1 so as to build a two-country monetary union model (see Table 3 ).
As the money market and the bonds market have been unified, the system comprises six markets (the two labour markets -immobile factor-, the two markets for goods -imperfect substitutes -, the market for bonds, and the market for money), which supposes five relative prices (the two real wages in terms of goods, the international relative price of goods, the rate of interest and the real price of money in terms of goods, which inverse is the average nominal price of goods). Because of the generalized budget constraint, the equilibrium condition for the market of bonds will remain implicit. ( ) Table 1 in the text) takes the form of a function of the fiscallycorrected labour cost, which relative variation is approximated by ( )
for small values of t ( t is the variation in t).
Appendix n°2
Starting from the aggregate demand function ( It is not essential to make imperfect competition assumptions in order to obtain a mark-up relation. Indeed, starting from the production function Y=CN , <1, competitive pricing requires the marginal productivity to be equal to the real cost of labour: where α is the rate of variation in (exogenous). Notice that an increasing mark-up on unit labour cost expresses in this case a declining wages-output ratio (α <0) and/or increasing fiscal taxes ( t =dt>0).
Y/ N=W(1+ t)/P P=W(1+ t)/(C N
-
Appendix n°4
The budget balance (B) is defined as:
B=tPY-PG
Differentiating around a solution indexed by 0 yields: 6 "If one applies roughly the formula to the data of the Eurozone, we find two results: the refinancing rate the ECB used since 1999 should have been permanently right ahead lower that it has been, and even negative, but it should had known also a markedly more pronounced rise that it had known…"
